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Abstract 
 
 Microfinance consists of small loans or savings given in the form of microcredit 
to help foster the growth of small businesses and help those who do not have access to 
formal financial institutions. Scholarship is mixed on whether microfinance is successful 
or not in lifting people out of poverty, but microfinance has been shown to help 
individuals run more successful businesses. Microfinance loans are not distributed 
equally; some regions and countries receive far more loans than others. Additionally, 
women receive more loans than men. This research analyzes whether minority groups 
have equal access to microfinance loans; particularly whether ethnic, religious or 
linguistic minorities have the same access as their majority counterparts. No correlation 
exists between the ethnic, religious or linguistic fractionalization of a country and 
whether or not they receive loans. However, some countries received a surprisingly high 
or low number of loans compared to their population. Due to the lack of conclusive 
information from my cross-national analysis I choose to more closely examine India 
which has high levels of diversity and greater availability of microfinance data. When 
looking more closely at India’s states and districts to compare percent of the population 
that is Hindu to the percent of the population that have access to loans there is also no 
strong correlation. Unfortunately, not enough data exists to fully examine whether 
minorities have equal access to microfinance; these questions warrant further study.  
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Introduction  
Microfinance is a system of microcredit loans or savings given to people who do 
not have easy access to trustworthy and formal financial institutions, typically in 
developing or semi-developed countries. The modern concept was developed by Dr. 
Mohammad Yunus, who began giving women small loans as a means to assist their 
business ventures. According to the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), “2.5 
billion adults lack access to formal financial institutions; this is about half of the world's 
population” (CGAP). Additionally, “one in seven people lives on less than $1.25 a day 
and lacks the necessary financial access and skills to become self-sufficient” (CGAP). 
Formal financial institutions tend to benefit those who have financial assets; formal 
financial institutions do not save or loan small sums of money that the poor rely on. 
Typically, those who do not have access to formal institutions rely on “credit from 
informal and commercial money lenders, but usually at a high cost to borrowers;” 
however, these types of options tend to be erratic and insecure (CGAP). Thus, 
microfinancing is important for people who need loans of small amounts of money. The 
World Bank states that about 160 million people are helped through microfinance loans 
(World Bank, 2014). It can be beneficial in helping people lift themselves out of poverty; 
although the extent to which microfinance is a successful method of poverty reduction is 
debated in the literature (Honohan, 2004). Still, many citizens of developed countries are 
passionate about donating to microfinance organizations to sustain small businesses in 
the developing world. Most often, microfinance loans are given to women so they can 
start a business and thus be more financially independent and better support their family. 
Microfinance loans and services are provided by Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) which 
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can range from small nonprofits to large commercial banks (Kiva). During the time 
period of the 1950s to the 1970s, governments and nonprofits experimented with aid that 
was focused on providing subsidized agricultural credit to small farmers in order to raise 
income and productivity (Hossain, 1988). In the 1980s, the focus shifted to providing 
loans to poor women to invest in their small businesses so they could accumulate assets 
and raise household income and welfare. These two experiments concluded in the 
creation of NGOs that provided financial services to the poor and eventually many of 
them became MFIs, the formal financial institutions that give small loans (CGAP).   
I became interested in the topic of microfinance distribution and lending bias 
while taking a seminar class on International Distributive Justice. Distributive justice 
“concerns how the benefits and burdens of living together are shared out between us” 
(Armstrong, 1). Microfinance is relevant to distributive justice as a method of 
redistributing resources and investing in small businesses. Most people approve of this as 
a method of redistribution because it allows for individuals to make the choice to donate 
money and often have a choice to whom they are donating. For example, organizations 
like Kiva advertise the women who receive the loans and what businesses they are 
running. This makes donors more comfortable with providing money for loans (Kiva). 
However, it also allows for donor bias to occur. Due to the importance of microfinance as 
a potential method of reducing poverty, it is important that all minority groups have equal 
access to loans despite donors’ preferences about who to give to primarily.  
 In this paper I attempt to draw conclusions about whether there is bias in 
microfinance loans with particular focus on bias towards ethnic, linguistic and religious 
minorities. I investigate this question at the cross-national level as well as the subnational 
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level with a particular focus on India’s states and districts. At the cross national level, I 
compare the ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization of each country to its 
Microfinance Intensity. Microfinance Intensity is a measure of what percentage of the 
population is receiving or utilizing microcredit loans. At the Indian sub-national level, I 
compare what percentage of each district and state is Hindu to the Microfinance Intensity 
of that state or district. I choose to focus on Hinduism for two reasons; first data on 
ethnicity and language are not as easily available. These three factors are actually often 
tied together in India. Second, Hinduism is the majority religion in India and is also the 
majority religion in most states and districts. 
At both the cross-national and sub-national levels there is not a significant 
correlation between high levels of minorities and lower levels of microfinance. However, 
there were some interesting patters that emerged. In particular, a few countries have very 
high levels of microfinance participation compared to their population size. Azerbaijan 
has a 39 percent participation rate in microfinance which is more than twice as high as 
any other country. However, Azerbaijan’s levels of fractionalization differ fairly 
dramatically depending which type of fractionalization is being measured; Religious 
fractionalization is much higher in Azerbaijan than ethnic or linguistic fractionalization. 
At the sub-national level, the most interesting finding is how many districts in India have 
no microfinance operations despite India having rather high levels of Microfinance 
overall. 
 In this paper I will first review what literature currently exists on Microfinance; in 
particular, I will detail what evidence exists in the literature for bias in lending and how 
my research can fill this gap. Next I will lay out my hypotheses about where the biases 
 6 
exist and who they effect. In the Data Description section, I will describe what data is to 
investigate my hypotheses and detail how I obtained this data. This section is divided into 
two sections. The first focuses on the cross national data and the second section focuses 
on the Indian sub-national data. In the Methodology and Discussion section I describe my 
methods in more detail and provide my analysis of what the data shows. In particular, this 
section has many charts of my data that show that no strong correlation can be drawn. 
Finally, in my conclusion I will reiterate my findings and describe why this research is 
important and should be further studied.  
 
Literature Review  
 Dr. Mohammad Yunus introduced the modern concept of microfinance. Yunus is 
an economist who was studying the economy in Bangladesh when he began giving 
women small loans as a means to assist their business ventures and then saw 
improvements in their household income and business success. Extensive literature exists 
on microfinance dating back to Yunus’s work in the seventies. Yunus discusses his early 
experiments with microloans in his book, Banker to the Poor: Micro-Lending and the 
Battle Against World Poverty (The Economist). Much of the scholarship resulting from 
Yunus’s work has focused on rural credit and women’s empowerment. Two of the most 
widely cited and reviewed articles resulting from Yunus’s work are two articles with 
conflicting conclusions as to how microloans affect women’s empowerment. Hashemi 
studies the role of the Grameen Bank and the Bangladesh Rural Credit Program which 
both provide credit to rural women in Bangladesh. Hashemi finds that the programs have 
significant effects on eight dimensions of women’s empowerment (Hashemi, 1996). In 
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the same year, Goetz and Gupta challenges Yunus’s claims that microcredit has improved 
women’s empowerment in Bangladesh; in their scholarship they claim that a significant 
proportion of loans given to women is actually controlled by male relatives (Goetz and 
Gupta, 1996). I will discuss this debate over women’s empowerment more later on. 
Although the literature is extremely diverse, it has primarily ignored the issue of 
equitable distribution and concentrated on issues relating to effectiveness and impact. 
Claessens, Honohan, and Hermes all discuss the impact of microfinance on poverty. 
Mayroux, Pitt et Al. and Duflo explore the role of microfinance on women and whether it 
is effective at providing them greater autonomy and lifting them out of poverty. 
However, there is some scholarship about distribution of microfinance; Rhyne and Otero 
focus on regional differences in distribution of microfinance while Sriram and Kumar 
look at rural access to microfinance. 
This paper will explore whether access to microfinance and distribution of 
microfinance is equal across different groups of people. Current scholarship makes it 
clear that women are more likely to receive loans than men and certain countries and 
regions have more MFIs than others, with urban areas having a higher concentration of 
MFIs (International Labour Office). Building on these basic findings, this paper will 
explore how demographic variables, such as religion, ethnicity, or language ability, affect 
an individual’s likelihood of receiving a loan from microfinance institution (MFI). This 
paper will trace the evidence on microfinance to develop a greater understanding of who 
has access to microfinance. 
Well established in literature is the importance of financial services for economic 
growth and development. But financial services are also important for the wellbeing of 
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people and can help to lift them out of poverty. According to Claessens, “Finance also 
matters for the wellbeing of people beyond overall economic growth. Finance can help 
individuals smooth their income, insure against risks, and broaden investment 
opportunities. Finance can be particularly important for the poor. Recent evidence has 
shown that a more developed financial system can reduce poverty and income inequality” 
(Claessens, 2006). However, banks and capital markets tend to have a bias for wealthy 
and well-off citizens, especially in developing countries where the middle class tends to 
be weakest. Thus, MFIs are very important for providing access to financial institutions 
and especially loans for low-income families (Classens, 2006). 
However, the specific effectiveness of microfinance in reducing poverty has been 
debated. Honohan argues that microfinance availability actually does not greatly reduce 
poverty.  However, the ‘financial depth’ of a country is correlated with poverty level 
within a country (Honohan, 2004). So, access to financial institutions makes a difference, 
even if microfinance loans are not specifically lifting people out of poverty. Morduch and 
Haley found, however, that microfinance plays an important part of reducing certain 
effects of poverty. They show that microfinance has a beneficial effect on smoothing and 
increasing income, a positive impact on health and nutrition, and increases primary 
school attendance. Additionally, they believe that MFIs can play an important role by 
targeting the poorest people, who make up “the bottom half of people living below the 
poverty line” (Morduch and Haley, 2002). One way to increase the potential impact of 
microfinance is to increase the regions and societies it serves. 
Hermes adds to the discussion on the impact of microfinance on poverty. He uses 
data from the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) database on seventy developing 
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countries and concludes that higher levels of microfinance participation are associated 
with a reduction of the income gap between rich and poor people. However, these effects 
are relatively small most likely because the countries economies are comparatively much 
larger than the use of microfinance (Hermes, 2014). Hermes states that microfinance 
programs are a tool to reduce poverty because “they disproportionately benefit the poor, 
compared to the more wealthy people, by providing them small amounts of collateral-free 
loans” (Hermes, 2014). This type of program is referred to as “pro-poor growth” because 
the incomes of the poor grow at a faster rate than the incomes of the non-poor (Jalilian 
and Kirpatrick, 2005). Hermes investigates whether there is a relationship between 
income inequality and the extent of participation in microfinance programs (microfinance 
intensity) in developing countries. Hermes measures microfinance intensity in two ways; 
the number of borrowers divided by a country’s total population, and the total value of 
the issued microfinance loans divided by the country’s GDP. When measuring 
microfinance intensity as the number of active borrowers relative to the total population 
the score ranges from 2.9% in Asia to 1.9% in Latin America, 1.6% in Europe and only 
0.8% in Africa. However, measuring microfinance intensity by average loan size divided 
by GDP, the scores range from 2.6% in Asia, 2.0% in Europe, 0.9% in Latin America, 
and 0.8% in Africa (Hermes, 2014). In my research I will also utilize the MIX dataset and 
calculate microfinance intensity as measured by the number of active borrowers relative 
to the total population. 
An important issue in microfinance is who has access to it; more specifically, who 
has access to MFIs to get loans. A large proportion of microfinance loans go to women 
and thus there is a significant amount of research about microfinance and women. 
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Women are more likely to live in poverty, especially if they are the sole bread-winner of 
their family. Women are also more likely to be excluded from the formal sector, which is 
where banks tend to focus.  According to Daley-Harris and Laegried, women made up 
84.2 percent of total microcredit clients as of 2005 (Daley-Harris, 2006). Today, around 
70 to 80 percent of Microfinance loans go to women; Makarfi and Olukosi note in their 
research that MFIs in Nigeria have disbursed over 80 percent of their funds to women 
borrowers for small business activities such as petty trade, food and restaurant services, 
and acquisition of capital (Makarfi and Olukosi, 2011). Women also make up about 70 
percent of the worlds poor (Women’s World Banking). 
Women are targeted for microfinance loans for three main reasons. First, women 
are targeted for microfinance loans because of the financial impact; “targeting women 
customers creates financially stable institutions.” Women are more likely to repay their 
loans because they are typically more conservative investors and more risk averse 
(Aparna Dalal). According to Hossain, who researched the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, 
which was the first MFI, “81% of women had no repayment problems versus 74% of 
men” (Hossain 1988). The second reason women are targeted is for their developmental 
impact; “targeting women has a greater impact on social and economic development” 
(Aparna Dalal). According to Duflo’s research on women’s empowerment and economic 
development, microcredit has focused primarily on women because “it is argued that 
women invest the money in goods and services that improve the well-being of families, 
and in goods that are conducive to development” (Duflo, 2011). Women tend to be 
poorer than men; according to the UNDP Human Development Report, women make up 
“70% of the world’s poor, about 900 million women” (UNDP 2006). Women are also 
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more likely to invest in their household and children, “Empirical studies have shown that 
women are more likely than men to direct additional income to household consumption” 
(Pitt and Khandker 1998). Women also tend to be more concerned about children’s 
education and thus invest more in sending their children to school than men; “Credit 
provided to women improves measures of health and nutrition for both boys and girls, 
while credit provided to men has no significant effect” (Pitt et al., 2003). Third, women 
are targeted for loans as a gender empowerment effort; “Targeting women reduces gender 
inequity and empowers women by increasing their decision-making power” (Aparna 
Dalal). Pitt et al. also demonstrate this in their work with Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, 
“Women’s participation in credit programs leads to women having greater role in 
household decisions, social networks, and greater freedom of mobility, increased spousal 
communication about family planning and parenting concerns” (Pitt et al., 2006). Finally, 
microfinance loans given to women led to a reduction of domestic violence in the 
women’s household (Gender and Microfinance PowerPoint). However, research has 
shown that there are some negative effects of women receiving microfinance loans. Just 
because a woman receives a loan does not mean she controls it; approximately 40% of 
women in Bangladesh have very little or no control over their loans (Goetz and Sen 
Gupta, 1996). Additionally, when women take on the responsibility of a loan and running 
a business, it is usually in addition to all their household work and caring for the family. 
This heavy workload can increase stress for women because the “lack of substitute care 
for children and elderly leads to added pressure” (Mayoux 1999). According to Mayroux, 
women in sub-Saharan Africa also reported limited socio-political empowerment outside 
the household due to fairly inflexible social norms and traditions” (Mayroux, 1999).  
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Women are the majority loan recipients; however, MFIs are not widely dispersed 
to reach all women. For example, certain regions of the world have fewer MFIs and 
receive fewer loans. Also, women who live in rural areas have more limited access to 
microfinance. Rhyne and Otero analyze multiple data sources and provide valuable data 
about the scale of supply of microfinance loans to poor people throughout the world and 
provide valuable insight about regional access to microfinance (Rhyne and Otero 2006). 
They found that although there are competing data sources, each of which reveal 
something different about supply, they were able to draw some conclusions about 
outreach and loan size on a regional basis. Access to MFI varies by region; South Asia 
has the largest outreach of MFIs, followed by East Asia, Latin America and Africa. MFIs 
in the Middle East, North Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Asia reach far fewer 
clients. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have the worst access to MFI loans 
and there is very little research about microfinance in the MENA regions. This raises the 
question of whether there is a religious bias component to whom MFIs choose to 
primarily serve. The MENA region is majority Muslim and there is a bias against Islam 
in the West where the majority of MFIs receive their capital to fund microcredit loans. 
 It is also important to note that Islamic law has broad principles that govern 
commercial transactions and more specifically have certain provisions for financial 
transactions. Most important among these provisions in Islam is that money is not an 
earning asset in an of itself, this means interest is strongly prohibited in Islam to charge 
interest on loans. This is an issue because conventionally MFIs give loans with interests. 
However, “Sharia-compliant” microfinance organizations do exist that conform to 
Islamic financing principles including providing finance without interest (Lendwithcare). 
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According to Suzuki and Maih, Islamic microfinance has been growing very slowly 
compared to mainstream Islamic finance which has grown rapidly and very successfully 
(Suzuki and Maih, 2015). The lack of availability of Islamic MFIs could play an 
important role why the MENA region receives so little microfinance. A lack of 
noninterest loan options or a lack of Islamic microfinance organizations being 
widespread could also contribute to Muslims outside the MENA region not being able to 
take part in microfinance. 
Additionally, typical average loan size varies by region; in South Asia loans are 
typically around $100 while in Latin America they are about $850 and Eastern Europe 
they are $2000 as adjusted for purchasing power parity (Rhyne and Otero, 9-10). Rhyne 
and Otero also conclude that there are major differences between urban and rural areas in 
their access to microfinance services. Rural populations are hard to reach because they 
are remote and widely dispersed, but additionally, microfinance tends to focus on 
“working capital such as trade business rather than for agricultural production” (Rhyne 
and Otero 2006). Donors also tend to donate to projects in certain regions more quickly 
than other regions. According to Heller and Badding, “loans originating from sub-
Saharan Africa are funded significantly faster than any other region, followed by West 
Africa. Borrowers from Central Asia and the Middle East wait quite a bit longer than 
other regions to receive funding, all else being equal” (Heller and Badding, 2012). 
Central and Southern African borrowers are funded 36% faster than West African 
borrowers which is the most popular region (Heller and Badding, 2012). Heller and 
Badding do not provide any insight as whether these funding discrepancies are related to 
ethnic, religious or linguistic bias. 
 14 
In addition to regional preferences, there is extensive research on donor bias and 
what types of individuals and projects donors like to fund. Donors tend to prefer 
individual borrowers to group borrowers and female borrowers to male borrowers 
(Cryder & Loewenstein, 2010). Donors are more willing to help people who share similar 
characteristics to themselves such as borrowers who share their gender or occupation 
(Galak, Small, & Stephen, 2011). Not only do donors react to how similar someone is to 
themselves, but research has shown that donors are influenced by appearance. Jenq et al. 
reported that “charitable lenders on a large peer-to-peer online microfinance website 
appear to favor more attractive, lighter-skinned, and less obese borrowers. Borrowers 
who appear needier, honest and creditworthy also receive funding more quickly” (Jenq, 
Christina, Jessica Pan, and Walter Theseira, 2015). 
Furthermore, the purpose of the loan also affects whether donors fund it. 
Educational, sustainability and environmental projects are the most popular among 
donors while home improvement and personal use are the least popular due to perceived 
lack of legitimacy (Heller and Badding, 2012). In sum, the research makes it clear that 
donor bias exists and it is not hard to imagine that if donors prefer to give loans to people 
more similar to themselves and to people who are lighter skinned that certain minority 
groups many get fewer loans.  
However, donor bias is not the only issue preventing equitable distribution of 
microfinance loans. Some research has suggested that microfinance institutions face a 
trade-off between profitability and reaching the poorest customers (Cull, Demirguc-Kunt, 
& Morduch, 2007). In India, MFIs are accused of seeking profits at the expense of the 
poor and have even been blamed for the suicides of borrowers in distress (Polgreen & 
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Bajaj, 2010). Ly and Mason have investigated the impact of competition between projects 
posted on Kiva on their ability to raise funds; they found that “an increase in the number 
of competing projects is associated with significantly slower funding times, and the effect 
is stronger between projects that are closer substitutes” (Ly and Mason 2012). Thus, the 
way that NOGs and MFIs structure and fund loans may contribute to how they are 
distributed. 
Most research has focused more specifically on narrow regions or certain 
countries like Indonesia, Bolivia, Bangladesh and India.  In India, much of the literature 
has focused on improving access for rural populations (Parikh, Ghosh and Toyama, 
2006), microfinance as it relates to poverty reduction (Imai, Arun and Anim, 2010) and 
the effects of microfinance on women’s empowerment (Leach and Sitarama, 2002).  A 
quarter of India’s 1.2 billion population does not have access to formal financial services 
(CGAP). Additionally, India is home to 21% of the World’s unbanked adults so 
microfinance plays a key role in providing financial services (MIX). Sriram and Kumar 
focused on what conditions caused microfinance to emerge in certain regions in India. 
They examined data to compare several Indian states on conditions such as 
“infrastructure, economic growth, density of population, and the availability of formal 
financial services to examine if these factors explain the growth of microfinance in 
certain regions” and conclude that the success of microfinance is due to external 
intervention from local government or NGOs and the number of agencies involved are 
high. (Sriram and Kumar, 2007). Despite this specificity of country and region, they do 
not include whether minority groups are more or less likely to live in the regions that are 
underserved by MFIs in India. Additionally, this research is not generalizable because 
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they focus on only on the mutual strand of microfinance which is only a small segment of 
all microfinance loans. In India there are two methods of microfinance, the traditional 
microcredit loans that are used around the world and mutual microfinance which is built 
around self-help groups. Self Help Groups are groups of impoverished individuals who 
create a group and then have access to larger loans and saving options. In this method 
they hold one another accountable to pay back loans and can cover one another for 
interest payments. 
Research has established that in most countries there is an income gap between 
the ethnic majority and ethnic minority(s). This income gap is based on many varying 
factors depending on the country; ethnic minorities are more likely to be impoverished 
and thus more likely to lack access to basic institutions, such as banks (Richtermeyer 
2002). However, there is very little current research that addresses ethnic or religious 
minoritie’s access to MFIs. Tran Thi Thanh Tu and colleagues have done research about 
microcredit’s effect on minorities in Vietnam. They found that, “empirical results support 
that micro-credit intervention in the ethnic minority community has a tendency to focus 
on job-creation and food nutrition rather than income improvement” (Tu, Ha, and Yen, 
2015). However, they do not provide any information about a difference in access for the 
minority groups in Vietnam.  
There is very little data available about how MFIs decide whom to fund. It seems 
that it varies significantly by the specific institution that is doing the funding and the 
country in which they are providing loans. However, there is some literature about where 
MFIs get their original capital to lend to clients. This is known as the finance structure of 
MFIs. Funding can come from various number of places; MFIs can borrow money from 
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big banks and investors (often in the West), they can issue bonds, they can take deposits 
(savings) from clients, or accept equity investments, which are ownership stakes that earn 
a share of the profit. Countries that have a well established microfinance sector end to 
have a more diverse financing structure than countries like Nicaragua, Bosnia, and 
Morocco that are much newer to microfinance. (Roodman, 2010). According to Roodman 
however, the whole sale borrowings category is crowding out savings category – “MFIs 
tend to underemphasize micro-savings and overemphasize micro-credit” (Roodman, 
2010). In such countries that are newer to microfinance, microfinance is growing very 
rapidly and borrower (micro-credit) dominate. This is true of India; although not new to 
microfinance it is growing very quickly right now “primarily by borrowers from domestic 
banks” (Roodman, 2010). Many MFIs receive crowd-funding via organizations like Kiva. 
Kiva pairs with Field Partners (that are mostly MFIs but occasionally schools or NGOs) 
who work at the local community level. Field partners are responsible for finding 
borrowers, administering loans, and sharing borrower’s information and picture with 
Kiva. Often the field partners disperse the loan before it is posted on Kiva’s site. Kiva 
uses the money they get from lenders to reimburse field partners (Kiva). 
I am expanding on this research to understand whether minorities, specifically 
ethnic and religious minorities, have equitable access to micro-loans. Additionally, since 
minorities within a country are often most comfortable speaking a dialect or language 
that is not as well known internationally, I am also curious if this affects their ability to 
apply for or receive a loan. Based on the lack of available literature about lending bias I 
think it will be hard to find a correlation. However, I do expect that some patterns will 
emerge in which regions and countries receive loans. 
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Hypothesis  
 Based on the findings that emerged in previous studies, I believe that 
Microfinance loans are not distributed equitably among the population. There is evidence 
that shows that rural areas have less access to microfinance than urban areas because 
logistically MFIs have a hard time reaching populations that are more widely spread 
(Sriram and Kumar, 2007). In many countries minority groups tend to be concentrated in 
the rural regions of the country. For example, in Northern Africa the Arab population 
which has the political and economic majority lives primarily in the cities and urban 
regions while the indigenous minority ethnic group known as the Amazigh (or Berbers) 
live primarily in in the rural mountainous and desert regions which are much harder areas 
for MFIs to access (Puhazhendhi and Satyasai, 2000). Additionally, the languages spoken 
by these people are not written languages and only spoken very locally which would 
make distribution of microfinance difficult (Brown, 2013). 
I believe that the uneven distribution of microfinance is more than just a 
geographical issue. Minorities groups receive fewer loans proportionally than do their 
majority counterparts; and the reason for this is due to donor bias, societal 
marginalization, and issues of access. Moreover, I predict that ethnic minorities, religious 
minorities, and linguistic minorities would be particularly affected by this phenomenon.  
H1: ethnic minorities are comparatively less likely to participate in 
microfinance as a result of societal marginalization, donor bias, or 
barriers to access. 
 
Ethnic minorities are often marginalized and impoverished members of society. 
Due to systemic oppression that often occurs against them, they are the most in need for 
financial assistance and aid, yet they may not have the same access to loans. Due to these 
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access barriers ethnic minorities may be less likely to have the means to even apply for a 
microfinance loan. They may not have access to transportation, or may not have the 
education to complete an application. Additionally, since ethnic minorities often live in 
more rural or isolated areas and often less developed, they may not be able to easily 
access MFIs to receive loans. 
H2: religious minorities are comparatively less likely to participate in 
microfinance as a result of societal marginalization, donor bias, or 
barriers to access  
 
There are several reasons religious minorities may be less likely to have access to 
microfinance. First, donor bias may contribute to who receives loans. Most MFIs get their 
funds from Western countries that are predominantly Christian. These donors may be 
biased against other religions like Islam; for instance, seeing a woman wearing a head 
covering might make a donor less likely to donate to that woman. As noted in the 
literature review, donors feel more connection and responsibility towards those who share 
the same faith. Therefore, I predicted that if religion were a known factor when 
applications were reviewed by MFIs then certain religious groups would receive more 
loans than others.  If the MFIs main goal was to maximize donations, especially from the 
West.  
Second, religious minorities are also marginalized in societies and thus may not 
have the same access to loans. Due to these access barriers religious minorities may be 
less likely to have the means to even apply for a microfinance loan. They may not have 
access to transportation, or may not have the education to complete an application. 
Finally, religious laws and practices may prohibit individuals from utilizing 
microfinance services. The majority of loans are given to women, however, some 
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religions have greater restrictions on what role women are allowed to play in society, this 
may prevent women from being encouraged to have their own business or apply for a 
loan. Thus if loans go mostly to women but some religions discourage a women’s 
participation is finance this could contribute to fewer members of this religion receiving 
microfinance loans. Additionally, Islam in particular has specific rules about finance that 
prohibit the use of interest. This may contribute to fewer Muslims applying for loans if 
the MFIs are not sensitive to these specific rules or if Islamic MFIs are not widely 
available in that region/country. 
H3: linguistic minorities are comparatively less likely to participate in 
microfinance as a result of societal marginalization, donor bias, or 
barriers to access 
 
I expected that linguistic minorities’ access would be limited by the fact that they 
do not speak and read the main languages used in the country so they would have a 
harder time accessing the information about getting a loan, filling out the application and 
going through any required interviews for obtaining a loan.  
However, based on the limited availability of demographic data from MFIs on 
ethnicity, religion, or language of loan recipients, these hypotheses were difficult to test. 
Additionally, religion, ethnicity, and language can often co-vary which makes it hard to 
determine what factors are actually effecting loan bias. At the sub-national level, it will 
be especially hard to eliminate the causal connection between ethnicity, religion and 
language. In India language is often tied to religion or ethnicity; for example, one of the 
main languages of India is Hindi which comes from the Hindu religion.  
At the national level, I will look at countries that have high rates of 
fractionalization in each of these three areas to determine if they are more or less likely to 
receive loans. Fractionalization is a measure of how diverse a country is. I utilized the 
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scale determined by Alesina et al. (2003) which ranks countries by how ethnically, 
religiously, and linguistically diverse they are. I hypothesize that countries that are more 
fractionalized, meaning they have a greater number of religious, ethnic or linguistic 
minorities will be less likely to receive loans.   
 
 
Data Description 
 
 Very limited data exists on the demographics of individuals receiving 
microfinance loans. MFIs and NGOs do not report much data on where or to whom they 
are giving loans. In particular, there seems to be no data collected on the religion, 
ethnicity, or language of the recipients of loans. Most of the data that does exist focuses 
on gender and occasionally rural versus urban populations. In the US, there are Federal 
regulations that prohibit lenders from asking about race and religion; this may be a factor 
in limiting the availability of this information around the world as many of these 
organizations are based in the U.S.  I test my hypotheses both cross-nationally and sub-
nationally. At the national level I utilize one hundred countries chosen based on what 
data is available. At the sub-national level, I focus on India and I utilize the available data 
on India’s states and districts. 
 
Cross-National: 
The microfinance data utilized in this research primarily comes from MIX 
Market, an online database dedicated to “strengthening the Microfinance sector with 
objective data and analysis” (mixmarket.org). Mix has data on both countries and 
regions. However, Mix only provides data on developing countries; it does not include 
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western Europe, North America, or Japan. It also does not provide data on all developing 
countries, as some countries do not have microfinance or their MFIs are not registered 
with MIX. Below is a list of the countries (Table 1) I used in my data and the volume of 
loans and borrowers in the last fiscal quarter, December 2015. 
 
Table 1:
Country Loans (USD) Borrowers 
Afghanistan $109.1m 148,598 
Albania $966.5m 63,280 
Angola $27.3m 23,164 
Argentina $40.5m 35,645 
Armenia $875.8m 412,971 
Azerbaijan $4.1b 1,200,000 
Bangladesh $5.4b 19,000,000 
Benin $178.6m 249,837 
Bhutan $205.1m 38,296 
Bolivia $6.6b 1,100,000 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina $745.2m 257,169 
Brazil $3.2b 3,200,000 
Bulgaria $774.5m 6,365 
Burkina Faso $189.5m 211,794 
Burundi $100.1m 50,925 
Cambodia $5.3b 2,300,000 
Cameroon $410.2m 297,063 
Central African 
Republic $3.9m 3,121 
Chad $11.5m 21,430 
Chile $2.2b 449,894 
China $31.9b 2,700,000 
Colombia $38.3b 3,500,000 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo $221.2m 249,193 
Congo $168.2m 2,251 
Costa Rica $78.2m 26,995 
Ivory Coast $206.9m 116,688 
Croatia $6.7m 2,348 
Dominican 
Republic $858.9m 649,792 
East Timor $17.7m 21,097 
Ecuador $5.3b 1,400,000 
Egypt $315.7m 920,250 
El Salvador $523m 146,316 
Ethiopia $664.7m 2,900,000 
Gabon $1.2m 907 
Gambia, The $2.2m 4,389 
Georgia $1b 323,542 
Ghana $785.5m 662,576 
uatemala $333.3m 440,363 
Guinea $19.50  117,037 
Guinea-Bissau $485,228  1,662 
Guyana $11m 3,476 
Honduras $418m 228,325 
Hungary $1.3m 60 
India $9.7b 47,600,000 
Indonesia $11.3b 1,300,000 
Iraq $176.5m 87,219 
Jamaica $108.6m 33,997 
Jordan $294.70  333,723 
Kazakhstan $486.3m 241,976 
Kenya $3.3b 1,600,000 
Kyrgyzstan $543.5m 433,990 
Laos $127.6m 72,012 
Lebanon $101m 81,069 
Liberia $20.8m 51,221 
Macedonia $321m 13,081 
Madagascar $144m 240,570 
Malawi $42.5m 373,790 
Mali $179.9m 294,148 
Mexico $5b 6,400,400 
Moldova $230.5m 27,185 
Mongolia $2.2b 516,300 
Morocco $593.7m 865,660 
Mozambique $68.3m 68,747 
Burma $139.3m 778,432 
Namibia $4.3m 15,415 
Nepal $354.4m 1,200,000 
Nicaragua $568.8m 127,071 
Niger $51.6m 252,067 
Nigeria $686m 2,600,000 
Pakistan $915m 3,700,000 
Panama $517.9m 48,832 
Papua New 
Guinea $50.9m 24,321 
Peru $11.7b 5,000,000 
Philippines $1.4b 5,100,000 
Poland $693.6m 38,377 
Romania $439.4m 17,877 
Russia $2.5b 308,838 
Rwanda $629.4m 176,957 
Saint Lucia $10.4m 2,145 
Senegal $507.4m 282,920 
Serbia $764.5m 50,437 
Sierra Leone $18.1m 110,713 
South Africa $3.5b 1,600,000 
Sri Lanka $748m 577,482 
Syria $13.4m 32,518 
Tajikistan $762.5m 338,114 
Tanzania $1.6b 368,314 
Thailand $11.2m 6,277 
Togo $162.6m 294,044 
Trinidad and 
Tobago $22.1m 10,396 
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Tunisia $146.4m 270,563 
Turkey $20.8m 67,414 
Uganda $662.7m 751,176 
Ukraine $236.7m 1,958 
Uruguay $240.9m 108,309 
Uzbekistan $1.2b 176,029 
Venezuela $666.5m 57,520 
Vietnam $6.7b 7,800,000 
Yemen $38.9m 106,612 
Zambia $25.5m 72,764 
Zimbabwe $12.9m 34,828 
 
Additionally, I used data on country fractionalization (table 2) to determine which 
countries had large populations of ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities. I gathered 
data on the ethnic, religious, and linguistic fractionalization of each country which comes 
from an analysis done by Alesina et. al (2003). To develop the fractionalization data, 
Alesina et. al relied on ethnicity, religious and linguistic data from lists created by the the 
Encyclopedia Britannica. I then compared this to the MIX data. Thus, my data is limited 
to only one hundred countries which both Alesina et. al and MIX had data on. 
Table 2 
Country Ethinic Linguistic Religious 
Afghanistan 0.7693 0.6141 0.2717 
Albania 0.2204 0.0399 0.4719 
Angola 0.7867 0.787 0.6276 
Argentina 0.255 0.0618 0.2236 
Armenia 0.1272 0.1291 0.4576 
Azerbaijan 0.2047 0.2054 0.4899 
Bangladesh 0.0454 0.0925 0.209 
Benin 0.7872 0.7905 0.5544 
Bhutan 0.605 0.6056 0.3787 
Bolivia 0.7396 0.224 0.2085 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
0.63 0.6751 0.6851 
Brazil 0.5408 0.0468 0.6054 
Bulgaria 0.4021 0.3031 0.5965 
Burkina 
Faso 
0.7377 0.7228 0.5798 
Burundi 0.2951 0.2977 0.5158 
Cambodia 0.2105 0.2104 0.0965 
Cameroon 0.8635 0.8898 0.7338 
Central 
African 
Republic 
0.8295 0.8334 0.7916 
Chad 0.862 0.8635 0.6411 
Chile 0.1861 0.1871 0.3841 
China 0.1538 0.1327 0.6643 
Colombia 0.6014 0.0193 0.1478 
Democratic 
Republic of 
Congo 
0.8747 0.8705 0.7021 
Congo 0.8747 0.6871 0.6642 
Costa Rica 0.2368 0.0489 0.241 
Ivory Coast 0.8204 0.7842 0.7551 
Croatia 0.369 0.0763 0.4447 
Dominican 0.4294 0.0395 0.3118 
Republic 
East Timor 0 0.5261 0.4254 
Ecuador 0.655 0.1308 0.1417 
Egypt 0.1836 0.0237 0.1979 
El Salvador 0.1978 0 0.3559 
Ethiopia 0.7235 0.8073 0.6249 
Gabon 0.769 0.7821 0.6674 
Gambia, 
The 
0.7864 0.8076 0.097 
Georgia 0.4923 0.4749 0.6543 
Ghana 0.6733 0.6731 0.7987 
Guatemala 0.5122 0.4586 0.3753 
Guinea 0.7389 0.7725 0.2649 
Guinea-
Bissau 
0.8082 0.8141 0.6128 
Guyana 0.6195 0.0688 0.7876 
Honduras 0.1867 0.0553 0.2357 
Hungary 0.1522 0.0297 0.5244 
India 0.4182 0.8069 0.326 
Indonesia 0.7351 0.768 0.234 
Iraq 0.3689 0.3694 0.4844 
Jamaica 0.4129 0.1098 0.616 
Jordan 0.5926 0.0396 0.0659 
Kazakhstan 0.6171 0.6621 0.5898 
Kenya 0.8588 0.886 0.7765 
Kyrgyzstan 0.6752 0.5949 0.447 
Laos 0.5139 0.6382 0.5453 
Lebanon 0.1314 0.1312 0.7886 
Liberia 0.9084 0.9038 0.4883 
Macedonia 0.5023 0.5021 0.5899 
Madagascar 0.8791 0.0204 0.5191 
Malawi 0.6744 0.6023 0.8192 
Mali 0.6906 0.8388 0.182 
Mexico 0.5418 0.1511 0.1796 
Moldova 0.5535 0.5533 0.5603 
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Mongolia 0.3682 0.3734 0.0799 
Morocco 0.4841 0.4683 0.0035 
Mozambique 0.6932 0.8125 0.6759 
Burma 0.5062 0.5072 0.1974 
Namibia 0.6329 0.7005 0.6626 
Nepal 0.6632 0.7167 0.1417 
Nicaragua 0.4844 0.0473 0.429 
Niger 0.6518 0.6519 0.2013 
Nigeria 0.8505 0.8316 0.7421 
Pakistan 0.7098 0.719 0.3848 
Panama 0.5528 0.3873 0.3338 
Papua New 
Guinea 
0.2718 0.3526 0.5523 
Peru 0.6566 0.3358 0.1988 
Philippines 0.2385 0.836 0.3056 
Poland 0.1183 0.0468 0.1712 
Romania 0.3069 0.1723 0.2373 
Russia 0.2452 0.2485 0.4398 
Rwanda 0.3238 0 0.5066 
Saint Lucia 0.1769 0.3169 0.332 
Senegal 0.6939 0.7081 0.1497 
Serbia 0.5736 0 0 
Sierra Leone 0.8191 0.7634 0.5395 
South Africa 0.7517 0.8652 0.8603 
Sri Lanka 0.415 0.4645 0.4853 
Syria 0.5399 0.1817 0.431 
Tajikistan 0.5107 0.5473 0.3386 
Tanzania 0.7353 0.8983 0.6334 
Thailand 0.6338 0.6344 0.0994 
Togo 0.7099 0.898 0.6596 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
0.6475 0.1251 0.7936 
Tunisia 0.0394 0.0124 0.0104 
Turkey 0.32 0.2216 0.0049 
Uganda 0.9302 0.9227 0.6332 
Ukraine 0.4737 0.4741 0.6157 
Uruguay 0.2504 0.0817 0.3548 
Uzbekistan 0.4125 0.412 0.2133 
Venezuela 0.4966 0.0686 0.135 
Vietnam 0.2383 0.2377 0.508 
Yemen 0 0.008 0.0023 
Zambia 0.7808 0.8734 0.7359 
Zimbabwe 0.3874 0.4472 0.7363 
    
 
India, Sub-National: 
In addition to examining the trends at the national level, I also wanted to look sub 
nationally to see if patters were more obvious with more detailed data. I used data from 
the Indian Census Bureau’s 2011 census which broke down the populations of states and 
districts by religious group. They did not have data on ethnicity and language broken 
down by state or district. India was chosen for this research for several reasons. India has 
a very large network of MFIs and receives a large number of microfinance loans. 
Additionally, India has a very diverse population that is made up of many religious, 
ethnic, and linguistic groups. Thus, India is an ideal country for evaluating minorities’ 
access to such microfinance loans. Map 1 shows the dispersion of India’s Hindu 
population. In my research I used the more updated numbers from India’s 2011 census 
(Table 3) which was broken down by state and district, however this map shows fairly 
similar percentages of the Hindu population. 
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Table 3: Hindu percentages of India’s States 
Indian State Total Population Hindu Population % Hindu 
ANDAMAN & NICOBAR ISLANDS 380581 264296 0.694454006 
ANDHRA PRADESH 84580777 74824149 0.884647217 
ARUNACHAL PRADESH 1383727 401876 0.290430121 
ASSAM 31205576 19180759 0.614658066 
BIHAR 104099452 86078686 0.826888945 
CHANDIGARH 1055450 852574 0.807782463 
CHHATTISGARH 25545198 23819789 0.932456621 
DADRA & NAGAR HAVELI 343709 322857 0.9393324 
DAMAN & DIU 243247 220150 0.905047133 
DELHI 16787941 13712100 0.816782713 
GOA 1458545 963877 0.660848311 
GUJARAT 60439692 53533988 0.885742237 
HARYANA 25351462 22171128 0.874550273 
HIMACHAL PRADESH 6864602 6532765 0.951659688 
JAMMU & KASHMIR 12541302 3566674 0.284394236 
JHARKHAND 32988134 22376051 0.678306054 
KARNATAKA 61095297 51317472 0.839957812 
KERALA 33406061 18282492 0.547280687 
LAKSHADWEEP 64473 1788 0.027732539 
MADHYA PRADESH 72626809 66007121 0.908853382 
MAHARASHTRA 112374333 89703057 0.798252186 
MANIPUR 2855794 1181876 0.41385198 
MEGHALAYA 2966889 342078 0.11529855 
MIZORAM 1097206 30136 0.027466128 
NAGALAND 1978502 173054 0.087467185 
ODISHA 41974218 39300341 0.936297158 
PUDUCHERRY 1247953 1089409 0.872956754 
PUNJAB 27743338 10678138 0.384890167 
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Map 1: India’s Hindu Population (%) 
 
MIX provides a Microfinance Geographical Index that breaks down India by state 
and district and provides information on whether each state/district is served by loans. 
This is useful to help scholars and governments understand the levels of financial 
inclusion within India (MIX). The objective of this index is to enable stakeholders to 
easily and simply visualize the geographical concentration of microfinance services and 
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thus enhance the understanding of the distribution of Microfinance services across 
regions (MIX). The data is aggregated at 2 levels, the state level and the district level. 
The methodology of this index is framed in a manner that included portfolio spread of the 
MFIs, their operation networks and their outreach levels. The information used in the 
index is self-reported by MFIs on a quarterly basis to MIX. The indicators collected are 
the number of MFIs in each state/district, the number of branches in each state/district, 
the value of loans dispersed during the quarter, the number of outstanding loans, and 
finally the gross loan portfolio. MIX then aggregates this reported data and compares it 
with Institutional level data to remove the discrepancies. Demographic data is used as 
complementary data in order to measure credit coverage in relation to the indicators 
collected. For the state index calculation MIX utilizes poverty data. However, at the 
district level poverty data is not available so they rely on illiteracy data as a proxy for the 
poor population. MIX converts the metrics to a percentile scale which allows for 
comparison across factors. A simple average is calculated based on all the individual 
percentiles of each metric to obtain a unique value per area. The final score MIX assigns 
is based on the percentile score. Using these index scores the results are divided into four 
groups; highly served is a score of greater than 75 percent, served is a score of 50 to 75 
percent, low served is a score of 25 to 50 percent and underserved is a score of less than 
25%. Additionally, states or districts can be marked as unclassified if data is incomplete 
across all the metrics. States and districts can also can be assigned the category “no 
operations” if no MFIs have reported working in this geographical area for that financial 
quarter (MIX). States or districts show up red if they are highly served, orange if they are 
served, green if they are low-served, blue if they are unserved, purple is they are 
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unclassified and grey if there are no microfinance operations happening in the region. 
This geographical index (Maps 2 and 3) provides valuable data on geography and loan 
access; geographical location can then be used as a basis for comparison between where 
minority populations are and where microfinance loans are given. For the country of 
India, using this data, I was able to compare which Indian States (Map 2) and which 
Indian districts (Map 3) are underserved and compare that to which areas have the highest 
proportion of religious minorities, since minorities are often concentrated in certain 
regions such as mountainous or rural areas. 
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Map 2: MIX India’s Microfinance Geographical Index, State Level 
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Map 3: MIX India’s Microfinance Geographical Index, District Level 
 
Map 4 shows districts where minorities are concentrated according to the Indian 
Government’s Office of Minority Affairs. These districts can be compared to the districts 
shown on Map 2 which depict access to MFIs in various districts. Most of the minority 
districts are concentrated in the northern regions. This same area is also where many of 
the districts that have no microfinance regions are concentrated. 
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Map 4: Ministry of Minority Affairs, Government of India 
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Methodology: 
 
Cross-National: 
The Microfinance data utilized in this research primarily comes from MIX 
Market, an online database dedicated to “strengthening the Microfinance sector with 
objective data and analysis” (mixmarket.org). Mix has data on both countries and 
regions. I utilized the MIX country data to find out how much money (USD) in loans are 
being given in each country and how many borrowers there were in each country for one 
fiscal quarter. MIX does not have data on every country; it excludes highly developed 
countries such as Japan, Western Europe and North America. It also does not have data 
for all the developing countries; for instance, Algeria has no data reported on MIX.  I 
compared the number of borrowers to the population of the country. This is referred to as 
Microfinance Intensity (Hermes, 2014). 
Microfinance Intensity is the extent of participation in Microfinance programs by 
population. Hermes calculated this using two methods; the number of active borrowers 
divided by the total population of the country or the total value of issues microfinance 
loans divided by the countries GDP. Higher microfinance intensities imply that more 
people participate in microfinance programs and suggests that a greater share of the poor 
have access to financial services. (Hermes 2014). 
I was interested in which countries had the highest percent of borrowers compared 
to their populations. I found many of these countries surprising and subsequently looked 
further into the factors that could influence this.  
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Figure 1: Countries with the Greatest Microfinance Intensity 
 
The highest percentage of borrowers came from Azerbaijan followed by 
Mongolia, Peru, Cambodia, Armenia, Bangladesh, and Bolivia. In Azerbaijan, 39.3 
percent of the population has received a microfinance loan according to MIX. In 
comparison, India had the twenty second highest percentage of borrowers with only 3.8 
percent of the population having ever received a loan. Hungary has the lowest percentage 
with less than 0.001 percent of the population receiving loans. However, this makes sense 
because Hungary is wealthier and more developed than the majority of the other 
countries examined in the dataset.  
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Figure 2: Countries with the Least Microfinance Intensity 
 
Additionally, most countries tended to have a correlation between their population 
size and the amount of money (USD) they receive in loans; as expected China, followed 
by India, Indonesia, Brazil and Pakistan receive the largest amount of loans. China 
receives $31.9 Billion in loans. However, there are many outliers. Turkey has a rather 
large population (79,414,269) yet it only receives a rather small amount in loans 
comparatively ($20,800,000). This is also true of Thailand, and Argentina. Conversely, 
Mongolia, Albania, and Azerbaijan have particularly small populations, around 3 million 
each, yet received around a billion in loans. Azerbaijan receives $4.1 billion in loans. Due 
to the high percentage of borrowers however this makes sense. It is important to note that 
Turkey, Hungary, and China, are actually comparatively wealthy. This could be a 
potential confound in my data. Without these wealthier, more developed countries I 
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might have more meaningful results. If this research were to be expanded, I would give 
more time to determining which countries I would include in my dataset. In particular, I 
would filter the data by GDP per capita to remove countries who do not receive much 
microfinance because they are already well developed and or have other financial options 
in place for the poor. 
It is unclear what factors affect this extreme variation in loan size. These countries 
are spread out across the globe regionally, they vary in size, GDP, government type, and 
predominant religion. Both Azerbaijan and Turkey are predominantly Muslim countries 
in the central Asian region. Yet Turkey receives very few loans and Azerbaijan receives 
an incredible amount. Turkey has a much larger financial sector, GDP and population, 
but many other factors are similar including government type and regional location. 
Azerbaijan’s main source of income is from petroleum wealth which is not true for 
Turkey. One interesting thing noted about the two countries while comparing them is that 
in Turkey 16.9 percent of the population live below the poverty line while in Azerbaijan 
this number is merely 6 percent (CIA World Factbook). This low poverty rate could be 
connected to the widespread access to microfinance but is more than likely tied to oil 
wealth.  
I also gathered data on the ethnic, religious, and linguistic fractionalization of 
each country. This data comes from Alesina et al.  (2003). To develop the 
fractionalization data, they relied on ethnicity, religious and linguistic data from lists 
created by the the Encyclopedia Britannica. I choose to use Alesina et al.’s data since it 
fit perfectly with the three areas of minorities I had defined for my research and it was 
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easier to utilize data that has already been critiqued rather than collect my own numbers 
which may or may not have been very accurate. 
I compared the microfinance intensity, that I calculated using MIX data, to the 
fractionalization of each country. Countries that have high fractionalization have high 
numbers of minority populations, if those same countries have low percentages of the 
population engaged in microfinance (microfinance intensity) then it would be possible 
that microfinance loans are less likely to go to minorities. 
The countries with the lowest fractionalization are Hungry, followed by Ukraine, 
Thailand, Congo, Croatia, Gabon, Central African Republic, Argentina, Romania, 
Turkey, Bulgaria, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Poland. No clear relationship emerges 
between low microfinance intensity and high ethnic, linguistic, or religious 
fractionalization as can be seen in figure 2. Uganda is the most ethnically and 
linguistically fractionalized, while it has an intensity of 0.0202 (meaning 2.02 percent of 
the population receives loans). Uganda falls slightly above the median for microfinance 
intensity. All the countries that have the highest intensity however, seem to have less the 
0.5 fractionalization score in any category, most fall much lower than 0.5. Peru however 
is the exception to this pattern. Peru is the 38th most ethnically diverse country (out of 
100) and has an ethnic fractionalization score of 0.6566. Peru’s microfinance intensity is 
0.164 9 or 16.4 percent of the population has received loans. This is the 3rd highest 
microfinance intensity. 
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Figure 3: How linguistic, religious, and ethnic fractionalization of a country effect the 
country’s microfinance intensity 
 
 As can be seen from the above figure, there is one outlier in this data. This data 
point is Azerbaijan. According to MIX, Azerbaijan has extremely high participation in 
microfinance. However, there is no evidence of this in the literature so it is most likely a 
mistake and I have decided to analyze the data without it, however I will discuss 
Azerbaijan later and what factors could potentially affect its high microfinance levels. 
Below is another graph with the Azerbaijan outliers removed 
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Figure 3: How linguistic, religious, and ethnic fractionalization of a country effect the 
country’s microfinance intensity with outliers removed 
 
 
India, Sub-National: 
My second method was to utilize the Microfinance geographical index to get a 
subnational perspective by comparing states and districts religious make up in relation to 
the number of loans they receive and the number of MFIs that exist within them. I 
utilized the percent score assigned to each state or district by MIX. At the national level 
many variables affect each country so I could not draw strong conclusions. However, 
within India many things remain constant thus eliminating many of the confounding 
variables. I used data from the Indian Census Bureau which broke down the populations 
of states and districts by religious group. They did not have data on ethnicity and 
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language broken down by state or district readily available online. Using the census data, 
I calculated what percent of each state and district in India identified as Hindu, the 
majority religion in India. I compared these percentages to whether MIX identified the 
state or district as Highly served, served, low served, underserved or no operations, 
determined by the percentage score that was given in the MIX Geographical Index 
discussed above. These percentages are determined by many factors but represent the 
populations access to microfinance institutions. I decided to use what percent of each 
state is Hindu as my variable because every district was some percentage Hindu; Hindu is 
the majority religion of India and is the majority religion in most of the sates and districts 
as well. Therefore, if there is a correlation between the states and districts that are highly 
Hindu and rated served by MIX then it could be feasible to claim religious minorities in 
India do not have equitable access to microfinance services. 
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Figure 4: Do states with greater Hindu populations receive more Microfinance? 
 
No strong relationship emerges from this data.  As it can be seen from the graph, there 
are three states with zero percent of the population that has access to MFIs, and are 
classified as having no operations by the MIX geographical index. These three states vary 
greatly in what percentage of the population is Hindu. Lakshadweep, an island state has 
no microfinance operations an is 2.7 percent Hindu. However, the other 2 states, Dadra 
and Nagar Haveli, and Daman and Diu, are both extremely small states on the 
southeastern coast of India. They both have very large Hindu populations, 93.9 percent 
and 90.5 percent respectively. However, the two states classified as “highly served” 
(>75%) by MIX both have a Hindu population of at least 55 percent. Additionally, all but 
one of the States MIX classifies as “served” (50-75%) are at least 58 percent Hindu. 
There seems to be a slight trend towards larger Hindu populations and greater access to 
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microfinance. The state of Punjab is the outlier; it is considered served at 66 percent but it 
only has a 38.5 percent Hindu population. The states classified as low served (25-50%) 
range from 2.75 percent Hindu to 95.2 percent Hindu, thus showing that states can be 
either high or low in minority concentrations have limited access to microfinance. I ran a 
basic bivariate regression and coefficient was 0.077 and the significance was 0.106, thus 
it was approaching statistical significance but was not significant. 
 Based on this data I felt that I would be better to get a larger and more specific 
data set. So, I analyzed districts in India, which there are over 600, to compare what 
percent of the population is Hindu compared to whether the population has access to 
microfinance based on MIX’s geographical index. 
Figure 5: Do districts with greater Hindu populations receive more microfinance? 
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As can be noted from the graph of the districts, there is also some correlation 
between Hindu population and access to microfinance. I ran a regression analysis for the 
district data as well. The coefficient is 0.151 and the significance is 3.46E-23, making it 
very significant. However, the majority of India’s districts have high Hindu populations 
and this only slightly effects whether they are served by microfinance institutions. 
 
Discussion 
Unfortunately, at this point in time, no public data exists on the demographics of 
borrowers and thus it is impossible to make a significant claim about whether borrowers 
of microfinance loans are less likely to belong to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities. 
No strong patterns or correlations emerged in my data, however some interesting results 
did arise. Most notably, why Azerbaijan has such high levels of microfinance in 
comparison to all other countries. Due to the lack of available data on demographics, the 
results had to be estimated. While my methodology was a good approximation of who 
was receiving loans, it is not highly precise because I can not determine who the 
individuals are that are receiving loans, nor do I know the ethnicity, language or religion 
of the recipients. It is still possible that minorities do not have the same access to 
microfinance or are discriminated against by donors or MFIs. However, it is also possible 
that minorities, who tend to be the poorest members of society, are actually the ones 
receiving the microcredit loans in society. The methodology that was employed in this 
research only allows for some general conclusions to be drawn based on pattern analysis.  
Although there is no strong connection between fractionalization of a country and 
how likely they are to receive microfinance loans, it is still possible that loan bias could 
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exist for ethnic, linguistic, or religious minorities. This is something that should be 
further studied. Although the results did not support my hypotheses, the results did show 
an interesting difference in microfinance loans to different countries, why does 
Azerbaijan receive so much funding compared to other countries? - this is also something 
that should be studied further.  
The weakness with this portion of my methodology is that I utilize the 
fractionalization data from Alesina et al. (2003). Alesina et al have received much 
criticism for being inaccurate because he relied on different sources of data depending on 
which country they were creating a fractionalization score for. However, given my results 
the slightly inaccurate or out of date data was most likely not a confound.  
In my second analysis, I relied on MIX geographic index of India and I accepted 
their determination of which states and districts are considered highly served (>75%), 
served (50%-75%), low served (25%-50%), underserved (<25%) or no operations. I 
relied on the MIX geographical index rather than calculating microfinance intensity 
because I did not have the right data to calculate it at this level. The geographical index 
provided a good alternative, however, I am choosing to trust their methodology. In my 
comparison of geographic regions that are “underserved” or “low served” by MFIs, it is 
unclear if other factors such as the rural-ness of the area, or state wealth, are actually 
affecting the number of loans given in each state rather than religious make up. 
Additionally, using a geographic comparison is not the strongest method for determining 
who gets loans. Because minorities tend to be poorer, it is highly possible that ethnic, 
religious or lingual minorities are the ones receiving loans in the highly served areas.  
 44 
In addition, other significant confounds exist. In my data, I cannot adequately 
separate variables. Language, for example, may be tied to geographic location or region. 
In India, states are, in part, created and divided by the language spoken in that region. 
Also, some religions like Hinduism are associated with a language, Hindi. Because of 
these connections, it is impossible to know whether lack of access to loans is geographic, 
linguistic or religious. Another India-specific confound is that several of India’s borders 
are contested which it makes it more difficult to determine whether concentrations of 
minorities fall within the country and are thus relevant to the data. 
 
Conclusion 
Although there is not much data currently available, equitable distribution of 
microfinance is an important topic which deserves further study. Additional related topics 
that should be further studied is why certain countries, especially Azerbaijan, receive 
high levels of microfinance than other countries. An interesting addition to the linguistic 
component could be how literacy is tied to receiving a loan. MIX actually utilizes literacy 
as one of their variables in determining the percentage served by MFIs. Another 
interesting question relating to religious component and donor preference is whether 
donors are more or less likely to give loans to women if they are wearing head coverings 
in their picture that goes with the description of there project. 
The literature on microfinance is limited mostly to whether loans are successful in 
reducing poverty and how microfinance implementation can be improved. The 
demographic literature of microfinance is very limited and primarily focuses on gender or 
geographic factors. There is a strong need for more data and research about other 
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demographic factors such as religion, ethnicity, and language and how these factors are 
related to access to microfinance loans. Due to the indications from this research that 
differences in microfinance coverage for various countries, as well as between India’s 
states and districts exist, more research should be done to draw stronger conclusions 
about why those differences exist and whether they are correlated to ethnic, religious or 
linguistic variation between and among countries. It would be especially useful 
information for MFIs and NGOs to determine who is receiving loans and how these 
organizations can effectively reach more “unbanked” people, especially to better support 
populations that are already marginalized. 
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